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 1 
Summary 
This thesis compares the process for selecting Supreme Court justices in the United States and 
Sweden from the time their Supreme Courts were established to the present. Both courts were 
established in 1789 and both were designed to function within broader governments generally 
organized in accordance with Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Bréde et de 
Montesquie’s theory on separation of powers. First, this thesis chronologically analyzes how 
the Supreme Court justices are selected and appointed in the United States and Sweden. In the 
United States, the President nominates the Judges of the Supreme Court with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Initially, that process was confidential; today, the Senate hearings are 
televised across the country and interest groups contribute to the politicization of American 
Supreme Court nominations. In Sweden, the King confidentially notified and appointed the 
Justices of the Supreme Court based on the Instrument of Government 1809. Even though the 
Swedish Government took over Supreme Court appointments in 1975, a confidential 
notification process continued until the adoption of the Appointing Permanent Judges Act 
(2010:1390) in 2011. Now the Judges Proposals Board administers the recruitment of the 
Swedish Supreme Court justices with open applications and provides the Government with 
recommendations. 
 
After analyzing each country’s development of appointing Supreme Court justices, a 
comparative analysis reveals the observed similarities and differences between the two 
countries. The main similarities identified include that the executive power appoints the 
Supreme Court justices, impartial committees evaluate the nominees qualifications, and 
public insight increases over the selection process. On the other hand, the magnitude of power 
the executive branch maintains over the Supreme Court justices selection process differs 
between the two countries. Ultimately, this thesis finds that the Judges Proposals Board 
equates to the functions performed by the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Standing 
Committee on the Federal Judiciary of the American Bar Association. 
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Sammanfattning 
I denna uppsats jämförs utvecklingen av rekryteringsprocessen av justitieråd till de respektive 
högsta domstolarna i USA och Sverige. Båda domstolarna inrättades 1789 under starkt 
inflytande av Charles-Louis de Secondats, Baron de La Bréde et de Montesquies teorier om 
maktdelning. Först analyseras i kronologisk ordning hur justitieråd väljs och tillsätts i USA 
respektive Sverige. USA:s president nominerar justitieråden som senaten därefter 
godkännander. Från början var tillsättningen inte offentlig, men numera TV-sänds 
senatensförhör och påtryckningar från intressegrupper har lett till en politisering av 
nomineringsprocessen. Den svenska regeringsformen från 1809 gav kungen ensamrätt att 
tillsätta justitieråd. Regeringen tog formellt över tillsättningen av justitieråd så sent som 1975, 
men fortsätt att rekrytera justitieråd med ett kallelseförfarande till 2011 när lagen om 
utnämning av ordinarie domare (2010:1390) tillkom. Numera administrerar Domarnämnden 
rekryteringsförfarande genom öppna ansökningar och rekommendationer till regeringen.  
 
Genom en komparativ studie har likheter och skillnader av rekryteringen av domare till de 
högsta domstolarna i USA och Sverige analyserats. Processen är lika till vissa delar: den 
verkställande makten tillsätter justitieråd, självständiga nämnder utvärderar justitierådens 
meriter och i båda länderna syns en framväxande offentlig inblick över hela processen. Å 
andra sidan, hur mycket inflytande den verkställandemakten har bibehållit över 
tillsättningsprocessen skiljer sig mellan de två länderna. Slutligen upptäcker denna uppsats att 
domarnämndens uppgifter anses korrenspondera till senatens och den amerikanska 
advokatsamfunds kommitté för domstolsväsende.  
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Abbreviations 
JPB   Judges Proposals Board 
Judiciary Committee Senate Judiciary Committee 
IG 1809 Instrument of Government 1809 
IG 1974  Instrument of Government 1974 
Prop.   Government bill 
Standing Committee The Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary of the American 
Bar Association  
SFS   Swedish Code of Statutes 
SOU   Swedish Government Official Reports 
U.S.   United States 
U.S. Constitution United States Constitution 
Working Committee The Working Committee on Constitutional Reform 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This year is the two hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the United 
States Supreme Court and the Swedish Supreme Court. Coincidentally, the appointment of 
Supreme Court justices has had a long tradition of secrecy in both countries. The United 
States Constitution entrusts the President with the power of appointing Supreme Court 
justices, while the Government expedites this duty in Sweden. In other words, the populace 
does not elect who will become the next Supreme Court justice and has to trust that those in 
power will select the best candidate. It was not until 2011 that Sweden adopted an open 
application process for Supreme Court justices. In the United States the Senate began opening 
it’s hearings to the public in 1929, yet why or how the President selects nominees remains 
largely discretionary. Consequently, the appointment of Supreme Court justices evolved from 
a closed to a more transparent procedure at different points in time in each country. 
1.2 Purpose and Research Question 
The purpose of this essay is to examine the appointment of the Supreme Court justices in the 
United States and Sweden, as well as analyze the similarities and differences between the 
country’s selection procedures. In order to achieve this purpose, the thesis will answer the 
following questions: 
-How are the appointment of the Supreme Court justices constructed in the United 
States and how does this compare with the Swedish system?  
-What controls exist to guarantee that the President will not abuse his/her 
appointment power in the United States? Does Sweden utilize similar or different 
forms of control?  
-In what aspects has the Supreme Court justice’s appointment process become 
more open in the United States and Sweden?  
-What are the formal requirements in order to be a Supreme Court justice in the 
United States and who assesses these qualifications? How does this compare with 
Sweden? 
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1.3 Method and Material 
In order to answer the research questions, a comparative legal method has been selected. The 
comparative legal method is based on a comparison of the similarities and differences 
between two legal systems, in this case the United States and Sweden.
1
 Professor of Law, 
Michael Bogdan at Lund University, stresses that when comparing how different countries 
regulate a specific situation that the applied legal rules need to regulate the same matter. It is 
not the outcome of the rules that are essential nor should a comparison focus on the labels of 
the legal rules; instead, the comparatist should focus on the conflicts that the rules are 
intended to regulate. This functionalism approach is advocated, since different societies tend 
to encumber similar problems that need to be addressed.
2
 Even though the United States 
belongs to the common law legal family
3
 and Sweden belongs to the Nordic legal systems
4
, 
the appointment of Supreme Court justices can be compared between the two countries. Both 
countries also have a form of a written constitution, which permits a constitutional 
comparison. Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Bréde et de Montesquie’s book, Spirit 
of the laws, provides a common basis for the constitutional comparison and explains the legal 
systems setup. Coincidentally, comparative constitutional law originated from the drafters of 
the United States Constitution who analyzed constitutional practices in other nations when 
they formed a new constitution.
5
    
 
Since the United States and Sweden originate from different legal traditions, it is appropriate 
to analyze the legal sources separately in the context of the relevant legal system.
6
 The 
analysis of the appointment of the United States Supreme Court justices consists of the 
following documents: the United States Constitution, legal doctrine and publications from the 
American Bar Association. In the Swedish section, the applied legal sources are: laws, 
legislative history (förarbeten), and legal doctrine. In addition, webpages from official 
authorities were utilized to access documents and attain the most recent information.  
 
                                                 
1
 Valguarnera 2013, p. 141. 
2
 Bogdan 2013, pp. 47-49. 
3
 Valguarnera 2013, p. 149. 
4
 Some scholars believe that Nordic law should be treated as an independent family, while others classify Nordic 
law within the Continental European family of law. See Bogdan 2013, p. 76. 
5
 Tushnet 2006, pp. 1226 & 1253. 
6
 Vogenauer 2006, p. 872. 
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The “Glossary for the Courts of Sweden” and the English translation of the Instrument of 
Government
7
 were readily utilized to translate the Swedish documents. At times the Swedish 
translation of official authorities and laws are provided in parenthesis in order to maintain the 
authenticity of the terminology. In both countries, the former selection process of Supreme 
Court justices was confidential, which explains why there is a lack of information from that 
era. However, this confidentiality emphasizes the magnitude of change that has occurred. 
Moreover, the majority of the Swedish sources of law are in Swedish and therefore there is a 
need to shed some light on the subject in English.  
1.4 Limitations 
This thesis only compares the appointment of the Supreme Court justices in the United States 
and Sweden. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts, the composition of justices, 
as well as information about the specific justices are beyond the scope of this thesis. With the 
intention of keeping the thesis as impartial as possible, political parties, race, gender and 
media scandals are not examined. Furthermore, the essay focuses on the most significant 
changes; therefore, the historical and political complexity of the selection process extends 
beyond this thesis. I found it intriguing that the American and Swedish Supreme Court were 
established in 1789 and therefore only these two countries will be compared. I also have dual 
citizenship in the United States and Sweden and this thesis is an opportunity for me to 
reconnect with my American heritage during my present endeavors. 
1.5 Disposition 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the subject, presents the purpose of this thesis, and 
explains the methodology and materials utilized. Chapter 2 examines the theoretical and 
historical background related to the establishment of the American and Swedish Supreme 
Court. Chapter 3 observes how the nomination of Supreme Court justices has evolved in the 
American legal system and is divided into three time periods that mirror the major transitions 
towards a more visible process. The next chapter, Chapter 4, presents the development of the 
appointment procedure in Sweden and is divided into three time periods that correspond to 
changes of the Instrument of Government. Finally, Chapter 5 answers the research questions 
through a comparative analysis. 
                                                 
7
 The Instrument of Government, http://www.riksdagen.se/en/Documents-and-laws/ 
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2 Theoretical and Historical Background 
This section begins with a Montesquieu perspective on the separation of powers within a 
state. This transcends into a deeper analysis of the original constitutional framework in both 
countries with an emphasis on the appointment of the Supreme Court justices. As a final 
point, a brief historical description of the inauguration of the Supreme Courts will be 
provided.  
2.1 Separation of Powers 
A theoretical background on the separation of powers within a state is crucial in order to 
better understand the importance of the Supreme Court justices in the analyzed legal systems. 
In his book, The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu discusses that a state has three divisions of 
power: legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative power makes the laws, the 
executive power establishes security, and the judicial power adjudicates disagreements. These 
three powers must be kept separate, otherwise it would threaten the life and liberty of the 
people. For instance, if the judicial power was intervened with the executive power, then the 
judge would act as an autocrat. At the same time, the powers should regulate each other so 
that they do not become obsolete. For example, if the legislative power is not checked by the 
executive power, then the legislators will implement laws that make the executive power 
obsolete.
8
  
 
Notably, Montesquieu’s perception of judges is still readily seen in both legal systems today. 
He accentuates that judges should not adjudicate based upon their personal opinion; instead, 
judgments should reciprocate the laws.
9
 In an essence, the judicial branch seems less 
impactful, since according to Montesquieu they are, “…only the mouth that pronounces the 
words of the law, inanimate beings who can moderate neither its force nor its rigor.”10 
Montesquieu’s statement neglects the complexity of applying the law to disputes in a 
constantly changing society and that judges must interpret the law as well.
11
    
                                                 
8
 Montesquieu 1989, pp. 156-157 & 162. 
9
 Montesquieu 1989, p. 158. 
10
 Montesquieu 1989, p. 163. 
11
 For example, in NJA 2010 s. 467 the Swedish Supreme Court acknowledged that a direct application of the 
Debt Instrument Act (1936:81) (Skuldebrevslagen) was insufficient, since the method of payment at banks had 
changed since the adoption of the Act in 1936. In the United States, the Supreme Court reinterprets the 
Constitution through constitutional litigation (for further reading see Bogdan 2013, p. 125).    
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2.2 Constitutional Framework 
2.2.1  The United States Constitution  
The United States Constitution (U.S. Constitution) stands as the core of the United States 
(U.S.) legal system.
12
 The U.S. Constitution’s first three articles strictly follow Montesquieu’s 
separation of power: Article I regulates the legislative powers of the Congress
13
, Article II 
regulates the executive powers of the President, and Article III regulates the judicial powers 
of the Courts. Each branch of government has certain powers that functionally belong to the 
other branches, which creates checks and balances between the powers.
14
 For example, the 
President oversees the Supreme Court by nominating the Supreme Court justices, while the 
Senate advises and consents with the President’s decision.15  
 
To guarantee judiciary independence, the justices received lifetime tenure to protect them 
from electoral pressures as well as no reduction in salary. Judicial independence was further 
emphasized in the case Marbury vs. Madison16, when Chief Justice John Marshall formulated 
the doctrine of judicial review, which enabled the Supreme Court to declare an action of the 
other branches of government as unconstitutional.
 
Judicial review has possibly given the 
Supreme Court more power than what was originally intended by the U.S. Constitution and 
the concept of judicial supremacy is controversial. On the other hand, the judicial branch can 
be perceived as the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches in the 
American system.
17
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Bogdan 2013, p. 124.  
13
 Congress consists of the Senate and House of Representatives. 
14
 Segal & Spaeth 1993, p. 12. 
15
 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. 
16
 1 Cranch, 137, 1803. 
17
 Segal & Spaeth 1993, pp. 13-17.  
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2.2.2 The Swedish Instrument of Government 1809 
The Instrument of Government 1809 (regeringsform) [IG 1809] diverged from Montesquieu’s 
separation of power in various aspects. Instead of three divisions of power, the IG 1809 was 
based on five functions: legislative, executive, judicial, tax, and regulatory.
18
 These functions 
were not distinct from each other; for example, both the King and the Riksdag
19
 exerted 
legislative power.
20
 The Swedish Supreme Court performed the judiciary function and 
adjudicated according to the laws.
21
 The King formally had two votes and judgments were 
expedited in the King’s name and certified with either his signature or secretion.22 
Furthermore, the title Justice of the Supreme Court (justitieråd) dissociated the members from 
the powers of the monarch. In order to accentuate judiciary independence, the justices were 
irremovable and could not be transferred to another post.
23
 According to § 5 of the IG 1809 
the Prime Minister of Justice (justitiestatsminister) was always a member of the Swedish 
Supreme Court, which meant that administrative and judicial functions were mixed.
24
 Instead 
of judicial review, the Swedish system incorporated judicial preview; thus, the Court 
reviewed laws beforehand in order to guarantee their compliance with the IG 1809.
25
  
 
Scholars debate about whether the IG 1809 was more of a formalization of Swedish history 
rather than a reception from Montesquieu and other international models of government. 
Professor of History, Sten Carlsson from Uppsala University, emphasizes that the judicial 
power in the IG 1809 was more than likely a reception from Montesquieu due to the more 
distinguished status the justices received.
26
  On the other hand, Professor of Political Science, 
Fredrik Lagerroth from Lund University, identifies that the King’s roll as the Chief Justice of 
the Swedish Supreme Court reflects the Swedish tradition of the monarch participating in 
adjudication from the Middle Ages.
27
  
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Modéer 2010, p. 141. 
19
 The Swedish Parliament. 
20
 § 87 of the Instrument of Government 1809. 
21
 § 17 & § 47 of the Instrument of Government 1809. 
22
 § 21 & § 23 of the Instrument of Government 1809. 
23
 Lagerbjelke 1996, pp. 40-41.  
24
 Carlsson 1990, p. 126. 
25
 § 87 of the Instrument of Government 1809. 
26
 Carlsson 1990, p. 124-127. 
27
 Lagerroth 1940, p. 526.  
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2.3 The Inauguration of the Supreme Courts  
Even though the U.S. and Sweden have different legal structures and are geographically 
disperse, the implementation of the Supreme Court occurred in both countries in 1789.   
2.3.1 The U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789  
Article III, Section I of the U.S. Constitution states that: The judicial power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.
28
 Yet, it was not until the Judiciary Act of 1789 that 
Congress established the federal court organization and gave the Supreme Court the original 
jurisdiction described in the U.S. Constitution.
29
  
2.3.2 The Swedish Act of Union and Security of 1789 
The Swedish Supreme Court was inaugurated May 15, 1789 by King Gustav III through the 
Act of Union and Security (Förenings–och säkerhetsakten). In retrospect, the establishment of 
the Swedish Supreme Court was more about Gustav III gaining more power and a 
consequence of the termination of the Council of State (Riksrådet). For instance, the members 
of the Supreme Court were only appointed limited terms of office and Gustav III did not issue 
specific instructions for the court. Consequently, it was not until the IG 1809 that the Swedish 
Supreme Court gained judiciary independence.
30
  
 
                                                 
28
 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.  
29
 Marcus 1990, pp. 93-94. 
30
 Metcalf 1990, pp. 5 & 15-16. 
 12 
3 The Selection of the American Supreme 
Court Justices  
This chapter reviews the development of the President’s appointment of the U.S. Supreme 
Court justices and is divided into three time periods that reflect the increasing visibility and 
public accountability of appointments. The first section describes the time period when the 
appointment process was confidential and explains the President’s and Senate’s role more 
thoroughly. In the next section, transparency over the selection process breaks through as a 
result of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Judiciary Committee) opening their hearings and 
the American Bar Association’s evaluation of the nominees’ qualifications. The last section 
discusses the increasing politicization of the appointment procedure.  
3.1 Closed Sessions (1789-1928) 
The delegates at the Constitutional Convention debated over how the judges should be 
appointed. Some delegates argued that the Senate should appoint the Supreme Court justices, 
while others argued that the President should solely authorize appointments.
31
 The delegates 
felt that if the power of appointment was vested in one person, then it would be easier to hold 
them accountable for their acts. At the same time, they feared giving the President a 
monopoly over the process.
32
 In the end, the delegates decided that the President shall 
nominate and appoint the Justices of the Supreme Court with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.
33
  
 
Neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Judiciary Act of 1789 specified qualifications for the 
federal judges. The first President, George Washington, chose individuals he felt were well-
qualified, but during the nineteenth century political party loyalty became the most important 
criteria.
34
 Indeed, the Presidents relied more on party loyalty, political experience and position 
in the upper social strata than good character, legal competence and congenial political 
philosophy when selecting a nominee. Presidents were less concerned with the candidate’s 
judicial opinions and were more focused on what impact the Supreme Court would have in 
                                                 
31
 Surrency 1987, pp. 13-14. 
32
 Strauss & Sunstein 1992, p. 1495. 
33
 U.S. Const. art II, § 2.  
34
 Surrency 1987, pp. 286-287. 
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the political, economical, and social realm. As a result, political affiliation gave the President 
confidence that the appointee at least shared his values, beliefs, and opinions. Political 
experience was also considered a better gauge for expected behavior than judicial 
experience.
35
  
3.1.1 The Senate 
The Senate has an independent role in the nomination process and serves two functions: 
advice and consent. Accordingly, the President can ask for the senators’ advice before making 
an appointment and the senators can reject the President’s nomination.36 During this time 
period, Supreme Court nominations took place in secrecy; in other words, there were no 
public hearings and floor debates were in closed executive sessions. Throughout the 
nineteenth century there were twenty failed nominations, which is more than triple the amount 
of rejections compared to the twentieth century. This suggests that the Senate had more power 
during the nineteenth century and can be explained by the fact that the Senate was still chosen 
by the Legislature.
37
 Senators became accountable for their actions after the Seventeenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1913, which entailed that the Senators 
from each State would be elected by popular vote.
38
 Furthermore, in 1916 the Senate started 
to have hearings on the qualifications of Supreme Court nominees.
39
    
3.2 More Transparency (1929-1980) 
3.2.1 The Senate Judiciary Committee 
In 1929, the Senate went from meeting in closed executive sessions, unless there was a two-
thirds vote, to having open debates on nominations. Then in 1939, the Judiciary Committee 
began calling on nominees to appear at their own confirmation hearings and posed questions 
to the nominee.
40
 As a consequence the public opinion held the Senate accountable and 
interest groups started to gain power.
41
   
 
                                                 
35
 Halper 1976, pp. 564-580. 
36
 Dorsen 2006, p. 657.  
37
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 3.  
38
Selecting Supreme Court Justices: a dialogue, p. 5. 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/focus_on_law_studies/publiced_focus_spring05.
authcheckdam.pdf 
39
 Dorsen 2006, p. 658. 
40
 Freund 1988, pp. 1157-1158. 
41
 Selecting Supreme Court Justices: a dialogue 2005, p. 5. 
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3.2.2 The Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary of 
the American Bar Association  
As mentioned in Section 3.1, there are no constitutional requirements for federal judges; 
nevertheless, all justices have been U.S. citizens with law degrees.
42
 The Standing Committee 
on the Federal Judiciary of the American Bar Association (Standing Committee) was 
established in 1945 and began evaluating the professional qualifications of Supreme Court 
nominees in 1956.
43
 They provide impartial peer-review evaluations of the nominee’s 
integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament and disregards the nominee’s 
philosophy, political affiliation, and ideology. It is important to clarify that the Standing 
Committee does not propose or recommend nominees. Instead, they complement the selection 
process by acting as an independent, neutral actor that rates the U.S. Supreme Court 
nominee’s into three categories: “Well Qualified,” “Qualified,” and “Not Qualified”.44 The 
different ratings are explained accordingly:  
Well Qualified - a Supreme Court nominee must be a preeminent member of the legal profession, 
have outstanding legal ability and exceptional breadth of experience and meet the very highest 
standards of integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament. 
 
Qualified - the nominee satisfies the Committee’s high standards with respect to integrity, 
professional competence and judicial temperament, and that the Committee believes the nominee 
is qualified to perform satisfactorily all of the duties and responsibilities required of the 
distinguished office of a Supreme Court Justice. 
 
Not Qualified - the Committee has determined that the nominee does not meet the Committee’s 
high standards with respect to one or more of its evaluation criteria – integrity, professional 
competence, or judicial temperament.
45
  
 
After the President makes a nomination, all members of the Standing Committee participate 
in the evaluation process. In order to evaluate the nominee’s professional qualifications, 
confidential interviews are conducted nationwide. The nominee’s legal writings are examined 
by a separate team of law school professors and another separate team of practicing lawyers. 
Then each team submits their analysis to the primary evaluator who then conducts a personal 
interview with the nominee. In addition, the primary evaluator prepares a Formal Report 
which the voting members review to determine the nominee’s rating. Eventually the Chair of 
the Standing Committee submits a letter with the nominee’s official rating to the: White 
House, U.S. Department of Justice, each member of the Judiciary Committee, and the 
                                                 
42
 Dorsen 2006, pp. 653-654. 
43
 Bloch & Krattenmaker, 1994, pp. 67-68. 
44
Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary: what it is and how it works, pp. 1-2 & 11. 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/Backgrounder.authcheckdam.pdf 
45
 Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary: what it is and how it works, pp. 11-12. 
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nominee. If requested by the Judiciary Committee, then the Chair of the Standing Committee 
and the primary evaluator will testify at the nominee’s confirmation hearing. Lastly, the 
Standing Committee displays their ratings on their website for the public record.
46
   
3.3 Modern Appointment Process (1981-2014) 
In the initial phase, the President often delegates the selection process to the Attorney 
General, Chief of Staff or other top advisors. The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Policy 
screens recommendations from politicians, legal professionals and interest groups. Then the 
names of the top candidates are given to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for background 
checks. The President still places weight on the ideology and partisanship of potential 
nominees and tries to avoid a power struggle with the Senate. Even though the final choice is 
the President’s, influences from others play a significant role. After the President’s 
nomination, the Standing Committee rates the nominee before the Judiciary Committee holds 
hearings and listens to testimonies from the legal community, interest groups and the 
nominee.
47
 
3.3.1 Politicization 
The support or opposition of certain interest groups reveals the ideologies of the nominee to 
the public and sends signals to the political community. By suggesting questions to the 
Senators, interest groups take advantage of the confirmation hearings in order to drive issues 
that are important for their members.
48
 The questions at the Judiciary Committee’s hearings 
have become more of an interrogation process of the nominee’s constitutional philosophy and 
ideological views rather than a verification of their professional competence. Since the U.S. 
Supreme Court interprets the U.S. Constitution, learning about a nominee’s constitutional 
commitments deems desirable. Still, a fine line exists between questions that undermine the 
independence of the Supreme Court and questions that contribute to the democratic 
legitimacy of the confirmation hearings.
49
  
 
                                                 
46
 Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary: what it is and how it works, pp. 6-7 & 10-11. 
47
 Segal & Spaeth 1993, pp. 126-132. 
48
 Selecting Supreme Court Justices: a dialogue 2005, p. 9. 
49
 Post & Siegel, 2006, pp. 40-45. 
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Since the judicial selection process was becoming more political, a Task Force
50
 was 
composed in order to evaluate the way candidates were selected, nominated and confirmed to 
the Supreme Court. The Task Force postulates that the magnitude of visibility over the 
confirmation process for Supreme Court nominees exacerbates the procedures politicization. 
Indeed, the confirmation hearings have been televised since 1981, which attracts publicity. 
The Task Force reiterates that the confirmation procedure has become politicized to the extent 
that the general public questions the processes legitimacy. In order to depoliticize the judicial 
selection process: 
The Task Force recommends that Supreme Court nominees should no longer be expected to 
appear as witnesses during the Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearings on their confirmation […] 
But if nominees continue to appear before the committee, then the Task Force recommends that 
senators should not put questions to nominees that call for answers that would indicate how they 
would deal with specific issues if they were confirmed […] The Task Force further recommends 
that the Judiciary Committee and the Senate base confirmation decisions on a nominee’s written 
record and the testimony of legal experts as to his competence.
51
 
 
Finally, the Task Force acknowledges that the appointment process is controversial, but they 
reiterate the importance of selecting competent and impartial judges as well as having the 
public’s fidelity.52 
                                                 
50
 The Task Force is a group of experts who could knowledgeably examine a system of judicial selection.    
(See Report of the twentieth century fund Task Force on judicial selection, 1994, p. 311).  
51
 Report of the twentieth century fund Task Force on judicial selection, 1994, p. 313. 
52
 Report of the twentieth century fund Task Force on judicial selection, 1994, pp. 311-314. 
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4 The Selection of the Swedish Supreme 
Court Justices 
This chapter analyzes how the appointment of the Swedish Supreme Court justices has gone 
from a confidential notification process (kallelseförfarande) to an open application procedure. 
The first section analyzes the King’s decreasing control over and power within the Swedish 
Supreme Court. The next section presents the legislative history that led to an open 
application process and the establishment of the Judges Proposals Board (domarnämnden) 
[JPB]. The last section explains the functions of the JPB as they are solely responsible for 
making recommendations to the Government (regeringen).   
4.1 Appointed by the King (1809-1974) 
The King held the power within the Ministry (statsråd) to appoint all the public officials and 
governmental positions; this included the Swedish Supreme Court justices.
53
 During the 
1800s the personal contact between the monarch and the Justices of the Swedish Supreme 
Court illuminated a political tone, since the Court manifested the King’s judiciary power. For 
instance, the Prime Minister of Justice coordinated the executive and judicial power and was 
often recruited from the Swedish Supreme Court justices. However, a political crisis in 1840 
removed this executive and judicial connection. Over time the King’s selection received 
attention in the newspapers and political debates questioned the validity of the appointee. A 
tradition developed where the King asked the Justices of the Supreme Court about who should 
be appointed. Another established custom entailed transferring the head of office from the 
Justice Department (justitiedepartementet) to the Swedish Supreme Court. As a result, the 
Swedish Supreme Court controlled the composition of their members and rejected suitable 
prospects based on their ideologies and political views.
54
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 § 17 and § 28 of the Instrument of Government 1809. 
54
 Jägerskiöld 1989, pp. 247-250. 
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The IG 1809 specified the following qualifications for the Supreme Court justices: a strong 
intuition, experience, and judicial integrity.
55
 In addition, only Swedish born men of 
evangelical descent were allowed to be Supreme Court justices.
56
 Throughout the 1900s there 
were few and minor amendments to § 17 and § 28 of the IG 1809. The most significant being 
in 1949 when these regulations became gender neutral and it sufficed if justices were a 
Swedish citizen rather than being born in Sweden.
57
   
4.1.1 Development of Parliamentarianism 
Structural changes in the Swedish Supreme Court system in 1909 resulted in the King losing 
his constitutional right to participate in the functions of the Supreme Court as well as his two 
votes. In retrospect, the King had only used his vote once and this was at the hundred year 
anniversary of the Supreme Court’s establishment.58 After 1918, Parliamentarianism became 
officially recognized in Sweden.
59
 JD. Martin Sunnqvist reflects in his doctoral thesis at Lund 
University that the division of functions based on the IG 1809 ceased to mirror reality. The 
Riksdag withheld more control and although the King’s power was more or less nonexistent, 
he continued to formally appoint the Justices of the Supreme Court.
60
  
4.2 Confidential Notification Process (1975-2010) 
In 1975 a new Instrument of Government (1974:152) [IG 1974] came into effect and § 1 of 
chapter 1 declared that: All public power in Sweden proceeds from the people. The 
Government officially exerted the executive power, while the King or Queen denoted the 
Head of State.
61
 The Government became responsible for appointing the judges and 
appointments were based on objective factors, such as merit and competence.
62
 According to 
the IG 1974 legislative history, merit should be based on the acquired experience from 
previous positions and competence should be based on the candidate’s theoretical and 
practical training as well as suitability for the position.
63
  
 
                                                 
55
 § 17 of the Instrument of Government 1809. 
56
 § 28 of the Instrument of Government 1809. 
57
 SFS 1949:111. 
58
 Modéer 2010, pp. 204-205. 
59
 Herlitz 1958, p. 96. 
60
 Sunnqvist 2014, p. 282. 
61
 § 4 and § 5 of chapter 1 of the Instrument of Government 1974.  
62
 § 9 of chapter 11 of the Instrument of Government 1974. 
63
 Prop. 1973:90, pp. 405-406. 
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The Official Proposals Board (tjänsteförslagsnämnden) for the judicial system was also 
established in 1975 and they were primarily responsible for giving the Government proposals 
for ordinary judges.
64
 However, this did not apply for the Swedish Supreme Court justices 
whom were appointed directly by the Government through a confidential notification 
process.
65
 During the 1980s and 90s the confidential notification process was extensively 
criticized for its’ lack of transparency and threat against judiciary independence.66 This led to 
a series of reports and in 2000 the Commission on the Swedish National Courts Leadership 
and Appointment of Supreme Court Justices (Kommittén om domstolschefens roll och 
utnämningen av högre domare) proposed that the Supreme Court justices be selected through 
an open application process. This entailed that available positions would be publically 
announced and all eligible candidates would have the opportunity to apply. In addition, the 
Commission recommended that an independent organization prepare the applications and then 
submit the best three candidates along with a motivation to the Government. There were no 
changes implemented at the time, due to a disagreement over if the Government wanted to 
appoint a justice that the organization did not recommend.
67
  
 
The confidential notification process remained in force even when the JPB replaced the 
Official Proposals Board in 2008.
68
 Since the Swedish National Court administration 
(domstolsverket) expedited the JPB administrative duties, the JPB was not considered an 
independent authority.
69
  
4.2.1 The Working Committee on Constitutional Reform 
The Working Committee on Constitutional Reform (grundlagsutredningen kommittén) 
[Working Committee] published a report in 2008 that also suggested an open application 
procedure and considered alternatives to the Government’s appointment power of the 
Supreme Court justices. The first alternative encompassed that the Courts would select their 
own judges, but this was considered undemocratic. Another alternative proposed that the 
Riksdag appoint judges; however, the Working Committee feared that politics would 
                                                 
64
 Prop. 2007/08:113, p. 26. 
65 Due to confidentiality, I was unable to attain more specific material about how the Government assessed 
candidates and if there was a standard protocol. I hypothesize that the Swedish Supreme Court justices were 
personally involved in the process as they were before.   
66
 Brandber & Knutson 2012, p. 33. 
67
 SOU 2000:99, pp. 11-13. 
68
 SFS 2008:427 replaced SFS 2007:1080. 
69
 § 4 of the Ordinance Containing Terms of Reference for the Judges Proposals Board (2008:427). 
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convolute appointments as seen in the American system. The Working Committee’s last 
alternative suggested the establishment of a separate appointment authority; however, this felt 
too foreign for the Swedish constitutional traditions. Thus, the Working Committee concluded 
that the Government should continue appointing judges.
70
  
 
The Working Committee also reinforced the need for a form of control so the Government 
does not abuse their appointment power. They rejected implementing the Riksdag’s consent 
as a form of control, due to the politicization within the American system. Instead, the 
Working Committee proposed that a committee, who is independent from both the Riksdag 
and Government, recommend candidates for appointment. They concluded that even though 
the Government should not be bounded by the committee’s recommendations, the 
Government’s alternative proposed appointee must always be controlled by the committee 
before being appointed.
71
   
 
Furthermore, the Working Committee believed that the appointment process needs to be 
transparent for the populace and independent from other governmental procedures. Indeed, 
this was considered another reason why a separate organization should act as an advisory 
board for the Government. There were apprehensions to the process being public, since 
lawyers in the private sector felt that it was controversial to publically announce that they 
were applying for a judicial position. In order to settle these apprehensions, the report 
suggested implementing general interest applications; thereby, encouraging lawyers to apply 
even if there was not an open position. Overall, the arguments for openness and transparency 
bared precedence; in fact, an open application process would further guarantee insight from 
society as well as constitutional legitimacy.
72
 The Working Committee was part of a larger 
reform process of the IG 1974
73
 and consequently it was not until 2011 that these suggestions 
were implemented. 
 
 
                                                 
70
 SOU 2008:125, pp. 326 & 328. 
71
 SOU 2008:125 pp.330-336. 
72
 SOU 2008:125 pp. 327-329. 
73
 See Prop. 2009/10:80. 
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4.3 Open Recruitment (2011-2014) 
Amendments to the Instrument of Government (2010:1408) also meant changes for the JPB
74
 
in addition to an Appointing Permanent Judges Act (2010:1390), all of which were 
implemented in 2011. The new Act implemented the Working Committee’s recommendations 
and therefore even the Justices of the Swedish Supreme Court are now selected through open 
applications. Thus, the JPB became completely responsible for administrating applications, 
giving nominee recommendations to the Government, and providing motivations for their 
selection.
75
 In order to emphasize the JPB’s autonomy, the Swedish National Court 
Administration ceased to be responsible for the JPB’s internal affairs.76   
4.3.1 The Judges Proposals Board 
The JPB consists of nine members: five permanent judges, one lawyer (advokat) from the 
Swedish Bar Association, one legal professional (jurist) from outside the judicial system and 
two representatives from the general public.
77
 The diversity in composition permits the JPB to 
better assess legal professionals from outside the judicial system.
78
 Historically, Swedish 
Supreme Court justices have been appointed from within the judicial system and out of the 
roughly 300 Swedish Supreme Court appointments only eleven have been members of the 
Swedish Bar Association.
79
 Indeed, the goal is to attain a wider recruitment spectrum that 
attracts the best legal professionals in Sweden.
80
 According to the JPB’s Annual Report from 
2013, there were ten applicants for one available position as Justice of the Supreme Court and 
two were recommended to the Government for appointment during 2013.
81
   
 
 
 
                                                 
74
 SFS 2010:1793 replaced SFS 2008:427. 
75
 §§ 1, 2, 3, 9 of the Appointing Permanent Judges Act (2010:1390). 
76
 Prop. 2009/10:181 p. 72. 
77
 § 4 of the Appointing Permanent Judges Act (2010:1390). 
78
 Prop. 2009/10:181 s. 74. 
79
 Brandber & Knutson 2012, p. 29.  
80
 Prop. 2009/10:181 s. 68. 
81
 Domarnämnden Årsredovisning 2013, p. 11. 
http://www.domstol.se/upload/domarnamnden/%c3%85rsredovisning%20f%c3%b6r%202013.pdf 
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The JPB also has stipulated guidelines
82
 for the organizations affairs. For example, the JPB 
shall invoke and follow a specific interview method when the JPB evaluates applicants.
83
 In 
order to be eligible, the candidate must be a Swedish citizen, have a law degree, and cannot be 
in bankruptcy.
84
 As stated in the IG 1974, selections must be made by objective factors, such 
as merit and competence.
85
 According to the JPB job requirement specification, competence 
is based on: legal knowledge, critical thinking skills, integrity, personal character, conduct, 
good speaking and writing skills, ability to handle stressful situations and to work 
cooperatively. Merit is based on previous work experience and other objective criteria can 
also be considered.
86
  
                                                 
82
 Arbetsordning för domarnämnden.  
http://www.domstol.se/upload/domarnamnden/Arbetsordning%20DNN%202013-07-01.pdf 
83
§ 15 of the Arbetsordning för domarnämnden.   
84
 § 1 of chapter 4 of the Code of Judicial Procedure. 
85
 § 6 of chapter 11 of the Instrument of Government. 
86 Kravprofil för ordinarie domare. 
http://www.domstol.se/upload/domarnamnden/Kravprofil%20f%C3%B6r%20ordinarie%20domare.pdf  
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5 Analysis 
To summarize, in the U.S., the President selects a candidate who is then evaluated by the 
Standing Committee. Then the Judiciary Committee conducts a hearing with witnesses and 
the nominee is asked to make a statement and respond to the Senate’s questions. The 
President can only appoint a nominee after the Senate has confirmed him/her. Thus, the 
President holds the ultimate power of appointment, but the Senate limits the President’s 
discretion.   
 
In Sweden, the JPB first publically announces an available Supreme Court justice position 
and then all eligible candidates are encouraged to submit an application. Then the JPB 
evaluates the applications, conducts interviews and finally makes a recommendation to the 
Government. If the Government chooses to appoint a candidate that was not recommended by 
the JPB, the JPB still must evaluate the Government’s selection prior to appointment. Thus, 
the Government formally appoints the Supreme Court justices, but the JPB actually selects 
them. 
5.1 The Appointment Procedure of the Supreme 
Court Justices   
The U.S. and Sweden have different systems of government and the appointment of the 
Supreme Court justices involves different steps, yet the ideologies behind the appointment 
methods are similar. For instance, the executive power appoints the Supreme Court justices in 
both countries and this is regulated constitutionally. The President’s and Government’s 
appointment power represents a form of control over the Supreme Court, which reflects a 
Montesquieu scheme on separation of power. Since the populace votes for the President and 
the Government, they manifest the populace interest when selecting justices. In addition, an 
independent committee evaluates the candidate’s qualifications, which will be commented on 
in more detail in section 5.4. Both countries also struggle with maintaining judiciary 
independence. In the U.S., the politicization of the appointment process underscores the 
validity and legitimacy of the Supreme Court appointments. In contrast, the intention of 
extending the JPB’s authority in Sweden was to eliminate political connotations and this 
explains why the JPB stands autonomous from the Government, Riksdag, and National Court 
administration.  
 24 
There are several differences between the evolvement of the appointment procedures in the 
U.S. and Sweden. The President has always appointed the Supreme Court justices in the U.S., 
while in Sweden it was not until 1975 that the Government assumed this responsibility from 
the King. Furthermore, the Senate has an independent role in the American process; whereas, 
the Riksdag remains outside of the Swedish appointment process. Consequently, the 
American model reflects a more traditional Montesquieu division of power, while in Sweden 
there was a fear that the Riksdag’s involvement would politicize the process. Another 
observed difference can be seen by the Government’s more passive role in the Swedish 
nomination process. The Government receives appointment recommendations from the JPB 
that have already been evaluated. In contrast, the President nominates an individual prior to an 
evaluation and consequently selects from a broader spectrum.  
5.2 Control Over the Executive Power 
Both countries protect against leaders potentially abusing their power to appoint Supreme 
Court justices by maintaining mechanisms of control. The Senate’s consent serves as a 
constitutional safe guard, but even the American Bar Association and interest groups have 
gained significance in the American system. More specifically, the Standing Committee 
regulates the competence of the President’s selection and interest groups place pressure on the 
President. Unlike the U.S., Sweden does not have constitutional measures that oversee the 
Government’s selection. Historically, the Government selected justices through a confidential 
notification process and possibly the largest form of control was the Supreme Court justices 
themselves. Since the adoption of the Appointing Permanent Judges Act, the Government’s 
appointment of the Swedish Supreme Court justices has been minimized to more of a 
formality. Indeed, the Government is now confined by the JPB’s recommendations. Even 
though both systems integrated an independent body that controls the qualifications of the 
candidates, the two countries diverge on how candidates are assessed and, ultimately, 
confirmed. The President selects nominees first in the American system; whereas, in Sweden 
the JPB recruits applicants in the first step.  
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5.3 From a Confidential to an Open Process 
Historically, the appointment procedure was confidential in both countries, but now public 
accountability represents a vital aspect. The American process has become more visible in 
smaller increments, in contrast to Sweden who sustained a confidential notification process 
until recently. Prior to amendments, the Swedish appointment process was criticized for 
undermining judiciary independence and democracy. The Swedish Supreme Court appeared 
to be a self-contained regime, but now the JPB instills greater transparency over the process. 
Through utilizing open applications, there should be more variation in the future Swedish 
Supreme Court justices’ legal backgrounds. In other words, the Swedish process has become 
more open due to a broader spectrum of applicants. In the U.S., televised Senate hearings 
allow the public to partake in the American Supreme Court justice procedure. The American 
system tolerates that interest groups increase the politicization of the process, since they also 
increase public accountability. Based on the analyzed materials, the American public attains a 
greater opportunity to influence the appointment of Supreme Court justices on a larger scale; 
while the JPB’s two representatives from the general public symbolize a form of public 
participation in the Swedish system. 
5.4 Formal Qualifications and Assessment 
In contrast to Sweden, the U.S. does not have any legal requirements in order to be a Supreme 
Court justice, still all the justices have been U.S. citizens with law degrees. When selecting 
nominees both countries look for similar attributes, such as professional competence and 
breadth experience. Another parallel can be seen between the JPB and the Standing 
Committee, since they are independent bodies that conduct impartial evaluations of the 
candidate’s qualifications. As mentioned before, there is no equivalent to the Senate’s 
assessment of a nominee in the Swedish system. Although the Senate appears to be less 
concerned with the nominee’s formal qualifications and more focused on the nominee’s 
ideologies as well as the balance within the Supreme Court.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
Though the U.S. and Sweden have different legal systems, the process by which they identify, 
appoint, and confirm their Supreme Court Justices is surprisingly similar. The U.S. has 
gradually transcended from a confidential to a public process, but the amount of visibility may 
undermine the original foundation of appointing Supreme Court justices. Sweden has also 
adopted a more open selection process and although the American model was considered, 
Sweden implemented open applications along with the JPB. In an essence, the JPB’s 
administration over the selection of Supreme Court justices can be perceived as a combination 
of the Judiciary Committee’s and the Standing Committee’s function in the American system.   
 
As both countries stride through the twenty-first century, I predict that the President and the 
Government will continue appointing the Supreme Court justices in their respective countries, 
but, beyond that, the selection process will continue to evolve. In the U.S., the Senate hearings 
will become more political due to fear that the Supreme Court will attain more power. The 
JPB is relatively new in Sweden and adjustments will be made in order to secure a broader 
recruitment. Both countries will continue to strive after maintaining judiciary independence 
and ensuring that Supreme Court justices are the most qualified judges. To conclude, the 
selection of the Supreme Court justices is complicated and controversial and it should be, 
since the Supreme Court holds the highest level of judiciary responsibility. 
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